






Justice is normally the language of complaint, and sometimes of 
revenge. Justice is often, therefore, analysed as a negative virtue 
whose demands can be met simply by doing nothing beyond 
correcting the wrongs inflicted on others. 
544 
However, most worked-out views as to what constitutes injustice 
involve at least an outline image of justice in a positive sense 
which goes beyond correcting the wrongs that have been done and 
include an impression of a "just" human relationship. The idea of 
injustice is closely associated with reactions to the disappointment 
of existing expectations. 545 
Hence justice, at least in its negative expressions, can have strong 
conservative implications in that it seeks to sustain the status quo in 
society against destructive and disorderly intrusions. 
544 Shklar for example argues that we cannot set rigid rules to distinguish instances of 
misfortune from injustice, as most theories of justice would have us do, for such definitions 
would not take into account historical variability and differences in perception and interest 
between victims and spectators. From the victim's point of view . . .  the full definition of 
injustice must include not only the immediate cause of disaster but also our refusal to 
prevent and then to mitigate the damage, or what Shklar calls passive injustice. With this 
broader definition comes a call for greater responsibility from both citizens and public 
servants. When we attempt to make political decisions about what to do in specific instances 
of injustice, says Shklar, we must give the victim's voice its full weight." The Faces of 
Injustice - Shklar, J. N. - Yale University Press Pub. : July 1992. 
545 Vide also: Kuklin, Bailey H. - The Justification for Protecting Reasonable Expectations 
www .hofstra.edu/pdf/law _Iawrev _ kuklin. pdf. 
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Disputes between Individuals 
When disputes between individuals or groups are considered and 
settled under private law, the intention is to protect an existing 
system of rights. If one man encroaches on the rights of another, 
he is liable to be required to restore the balance, (i) by making good 
for the damage he has caused or (ii) by paying compensation and/ 
(iii) or at least undertaking to respect the rights of the injured party
in future.
This concept clearly stated in the Maltese Civil Code namely under 
Article 1047 (1) 
"The damage which consists in depriving a person of the use of his 
own money, shall be made good by the payment of interest at the 
rate of eight per cent a year. 
(2) If, however, the party causing the damage has acted
maliciously, the court may, according to circumstances, grant also
to the injured party compensation for any other damage sustained
by him, including every loss of earnings, if it is shown that the
party causing the damage, by depriving the party injured of the use
of his own money, had particularly the intention of causing him
such other damage, or if such damage is the immediate and direct
consequence of the injured party having been so deprived of the
use of his own money."
The Concept of Restitutio in Integrum 
The procedures of legal justice, in these types of instance, are 
conservative, protecting and restoring an established order thus a 
form of restitutio in integrum. In the Roman empire, where Ticius 
did wrong to Caius, the former had to compensate the latter by a 
restitutio in integrum. That meant, and still means to this day, 
placing the victim of a breach of contract or a tortious act in the 
same position they were before the event. The Romans clearly 
understood the principle that a claimant must be put back to where 
they were before the damage was done to them, and this would be 
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never achieved unless the victim was fully compensated (in 
integrum). Roman law, then, conceived restitutio in integrum to be 
accomplished where the claimant received the principal sum due, 
interests at a certain rate from a certain date, compensation for their 
economic losses and the costs incurred by them in seekingjustice. 
Restitutio in integrum has since been fundamental rule of law in the 
countries that follow civil law. Traditionally, in the civil law 
system, it includes loss of profits or economic loss in both contract 
and tort ( e.g. Article 1149 of the French Civil Code; Article 1106 
of the Spanish Civil Code; Article 1995 of the Louisiana Code 
1985). Damages in contract are deemed to be, except in cases of 
fraud, those which are direct and foreseeable at the time of the 
contract (Article 1150 France; Article 1107 Spain); damages in tort 
are those which are direct and immediate including loss of profit, 
so foreseeability is not necessary. 
In civil law, interest is always awarded as part of the economic loss 
to which claimants are entitled. Interest is payable unquestionably 
where the debtor has delayed in performing their obligation to pay 
a sum of money (Article 1153 France; Article 1108 Spain). Pre­
judgment interest is awarded as an integral part of damages, in all 
cases, in the currency of the loss, in both contract and tort, 
compounded at the average prime rate of the currency in which that 
loss or damage was sustained, from the date of the breach or the 
loss to the date of judgment. Post-judgment interest is awarded at 
the average prime bank rate (so to reflect the monetary value) for 
the period from the date of judgement until final payment. 
In the common law countries, the courts often refuse to award 
complete compensation (restitution in integrum ). Most of them 
have been unwilling to award damages for pure economic loss (i.e. 
damages in tort when there is no physical damage) even if the 
damages were direct and foreseeable.546 Also, almost regularly, 
damages in foreign currency were refused (until Miliangos [1975] 
in England and The Amoco Cadiz [1992] in the US 7th Circuit). 
546 The Mineral Transporter [1986] AC I; [1985] 2 LI R 303. 
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For example, the common law courts refused pre-judgment interest 
and interest above a certain rate, although in Admiralty 
jurisdictions, equity has been recognised and damages have been 
awarded in a way close to restitutio in integrum. 
The courts in the UK, US and Australia have very rarely granted 
economic loss where the claimant did not sustain direct physical 
damage. Also, common law jurisdictions have been more 
restrictive regarding interest, though they are opening up gradually 
(S.35A The Supreme Court Act 1981) so as to render it a matter of 
the discretion of the court, as opposed to a right of the claimant 
successful in the judgment. 547 
The discrepancies between civil law and common law over the 
application of the rule of restitutio in integrum have given rise to 
conflict of laws and to somewhat irrational solutions to the 
assessment of damages. The laws applicable to damages differ 
among themselves because some jurisdictions and the practices of 
certain courts depart from the Roman rule to adopt rules of thumb 
and unsubstantiated criteria for special circumstances. In Maltese 
law the restitutio in integrum concept is explicitly mentioned in the 
Commercial Code (Chapter 13) Article 541,548 regarding the 
prescription and inadmissibility of action in certain commercial 
matters, and also in the Civil Code, more precisely under Article 
1765549 relating to the form and effects of donations550 and also in 
the Patents Act (Chapter 417) under Article 46 concerning the re­
establishment of rights. 551 
Progressive Justice 
However, law has a progressive or reformative aspect as well. 
Laws promulgated by the legislature from time to time change the 
547 Making it a discretionary remedy only: House of Lords in President Of India vs La 
Pintada Cia Navegacion [1984] 2 Ll.R 9 at p23. 
548 Title I 
549 Restitutio in integrum. Amended by: XL VI.1973.92. 
550 Sub-title II 
551 PART XIII 
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rules in accordance with new conceptions of what is fair and 
proper. Such as Human Rights legislation, changes in the Maltese 
Civil Code promoting parental authority instead of paternal 
authority, changes concerning the promotion of equality between 
man and woman, the granting of parental leave for both parents, a 
better distribution of children's allowance benefits, the recognition 
of the housewife 's work through a bonus, there have been new laws 
about protection at work, requiring safety precautions in 
industries, forbidding unfair dismissal, limiting the power of 
employers to make workpeople redundant; and internationally the 
promulgation of the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of 
Children, the recognition by the International Community of the 
principles of Common Heritage of Mankind, of The Rights of 
Future Generations, and of Common Concern about the planet's 
climate and so on. 
In social deontology, as in law, the preservative aspect of justice 
upholds the established order of things. Persons are entitled to 
keep what they have, their rights and property. Many feel that it is 
unjust to upset the existing differentials in pay for different jobs. At 
the same time nearly everybody also attributes to justice a 
reformative role, allowing "new" (or should one say newly­
recognised) rights to be set up on the basis of (a) need or (b) merit.
The idea is that justice, in the sense of retaining differentials for 
different jobs does not require any class of persons to stay where 
they are in the established hierarchy, on the contrary, if they are 
especially talented or especially hard-working, it is just for them to 
be rewarded and to move up the social scale. What we have up till 
now called preservative justice tries to keep things as they are, on 
the assumption that everyone benefits from a stable society, despite 
the defects of any actual social order. 
Reformative Justice 
Reformative justice tries to remedy the defects, to redistribute 
rights in such a way as to make a fairer society. But what is fair? 
There have been two different, and apparently incompatible, ideas 
- 401 -
Just Problems? Id-Tuitt 2006 - Volume XIX 
about this. First there is the idea of justice as depending on merit 
or desert. It can be seen in criminal justice as well as in ideas of 
fairness in social ethics. For example, criminal justice is a matter 
of punishing people who have been found guilty of breaching the 
law; it would be seriously unjust to punish people who have done 
nothing to deserve it. 
Likewise, just desert has to do with merit - this means that a reward 
or honour, should go to the person who earns it, who deserves it. 
To pass over the candidate or contestant who deserved the reward 
and to hand it to somebody who did not deserve it would be unjust, 
unfair. Why? 
The problem in practice lies in how do you assess who is more 
meritorious than whom. In other words, how should we classify 
who is the best candidate? What criteria should we use to assert 
that "A" is for example, more intelligent than "B" in order to 
reward him? For now suffice it to say that something which is not 
due to someone and which is given to him, makes that donation, an 
unfair and unjust act. 
However, there is another idea of justice, based on equality and 
need. According to this view, justice requires us to treat all human 
beings as equal worth and as having equal claims. According to 
this view it is unjust to discriminate in favour of some and against 
others - except in order to meet special needs - what we call 
positive discrimination. And what is discrimination? 
Discrimination may be descriptively summarised as treating people 
unequally and therefore that is often unjust (according an 
egalitarian concept of justice), discrimination in favour of need has 
an egalitarian purpose. It gives more to the needy because they 
have less - it is an attempt to reduce inequality, to approach that 
ideal of equality for all which according to this view, would be 
perfect justice. 
Other kinds of discrimination, however, are inegalitarian in effect 
as well as in method - they increase the existing inequalities. The 
idea behind this conception of justice is that the particularly 
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talented individual already has an advantage over ordinary people. 
If he is given special rewards, or special prizes, or a specially good 
job, you will increase his advantage. It may well be advantageous 
to the community to do this - in that the person with special talents 
for a particular job, such as running a business or running a school, 
will no doubt bring more benefit to the community in doing that 
job than would someone else of less talent. 
So it makes sense, it is reasonable to train the talented individual, 
put him in the responsible job, and pay him well as an incentive. It 
is socially useful, and right for that reason but if this view is 
adopted one cannot conclude that this is necessarily just or 
equitable. Strict justice, according to this view, requires us to treat 
everybody alike, apart from helping underdogs to approach 
equality with the rest. 
Each of these theories of justice appears to have an intuitive appeal 
for our moral consciousness. They both make a persuasive case. 
Professor John Rawls has produced an ingenious suggestion for 
settling the principles of justice in a rational way. It is intended to 
be a method of avoiding appeals to intuition with the consequent 
risk of inconsistent answers. 552 
Rawls uses the device · of a hypothetical social contract, a notion 
familiar in earlier political philosophy but employed for a different 
purpose. Rawls asks us to imagine a number of people who know 
the general laws of social science but are ignorant of all particular 
facts, including their own abilities, their won history, their own 
position in society, or indeed the time and place of that society. 
They are asked to agree upon principles for the distribution of 
benefits and burdens. We can suppose, Rawls adds, that they will 
think about the matter in terms of self-interest, trying to maximise 
benefits and minimise burdens for themselves. They do not know 
where they themselves will be in the ordering of affairs. They 
might be at the top of the social scale or they might be at the 
bottom. So, says Rawls, they will take care to make conditions as 
552 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1973, especially chapter III. 
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good as possible for the person at the bottom of the scale, in case 
they tum out to be there themselves. Their decisions will be 
motivated by self-interest but will have the effect of serving the 
interest of everyone impartially, because of "the veil of ignorance". 
In Rawls's view, that is what constitutes the idea of justice as 
fairness. Justice then is an institutional arrangement which will, in 
Rawls's view benefit everyone impartially, and we can reach an 
understanding of it by imagining a social contract made in 
ignorance of one's personal situation. 
Rawls is not here suggesting that the concept of justice can be 
identified with an idea of self-interest. Justice is essentially 
impartial between one person and another. This reminds us of 
Finnis's requirements of practical reason.553 The third requirement 
in Finnis's list refers to the fundamental impartiality among the 
human subjects who are or may be partakers of those goods. So, 
the only reason for me to prefer my well-being is that it is through 
my self-determined and self-realising participation in the basic 
goods that one can do what reasonableness suggests and requires, 
i.e. favour and realise the forms of human good indicated in the
first principles of practical reason; and so add or contribute to the
common good which insures justice for all. As Rawls puts it, if
you ask yourself in any situation what would be the just or fair
solution of a problem, you should not think in terms of self-interest,
giving yourself priority over others. The difficulty is that if people
are simply told to think intuitively in terms of justice, they will
come up with different and inconsistent answers. 554 
A rational calculation in terms of self-interest will avoid the bare 
reference to intuitions of justice, but in the ordinary way such a 
calculation would not give us the impartiality that we need. 
Moreover, the hypothesis of making the calculation under a veil of 
553 Coherent life plan; No arbitrary preferences amongst the basic values; No arbitrary 
preferences amongst persons; Proper sense of detachment; Proper sense of commitment; 
limited relevance of efficient means; Respect for every basic value in every act; Common 
good of one's community; Follow one's conscience; 
554 Raphael, D.D. Moral Philosophy, pp.72. 
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ignorance about one's personal situation is a method of adding 
impartiality. If one have to provide for my own interests in any 
and every possible contingency, one am providing for the interests 
of any everyone, not just for my own. This should remind us of the 
Kantian Categorical Imperative in the form of "act as if you were 
legislating for everyone", Rawls would add, starting from the poor. 
Kant's "Categorical Imperative" reveals the injustice of "excepting" 
ourselves from conventional social practices like promise 
keeping. But can it equally reveal the injustice of "complying" with 
socially entrenched unjust maxims, e.g., slave-holding maxims in 
colonial America? Standard Kantian arguments against slavery 
depend on overly narrow definitions of slavery and by requiring 
universalisation across all rational beings, beg the moral question 
of whether differences ever warrant different treatment. 555 
To get back to Rawls, behind the veil of ignorance though you 
might think self-interestedly, you are really constrained reasonably 
to act as if you were legislating for everyone. This point about 
legislating for everyone compels us to analyse what would be the 
result of such a hypothetical contract made under a veil of 
ignorance about particular facts? According to Rawls, people in 
this system would go first for a maximum of equal liberty, and then 
secondly they would agree to such departures from equality as 
would improve life for everyone, including the least fortunate. 
The point of the second principle is to make a distinction between 
just and unjust inequalities. If the giving of special rewards or 
special opportunities to talented people not only produces 
substantial benefit for those few, with consequent inequality, but 
also has the result of improving the general standard of life of the 
whole community, including the standard of its poorest members, 
then the inequality is justified. 
555 Calhoun, Cheshire, Kant and Compliance With Conventionalised Injustice - SJ Phil, 
32(2), 135-159, Sum 94 
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However, we have a condition imposed by Rawls: if the benefit 
accrues only to the privileged group and does nothing to improve 
the situation of the poor, of those least advantaged, then it is not 
justified. This is the main argument against factionism. But this is 
not just a justice argument in favour of charity.556 There is an 
economical aspect to it as well; after all a wealthier lower class 
enhances the general good of the whole society. This conclusion 
gives priority to an equality concept of justice. It also makes some 
provision for the alternative concept of differential reward, though 
not in terms of merit, strictly speaking. It says that differential 
rewards are justified, not because they are deserved by the 
individuals who get them, but because they benefit the whole 
community and especially its poorest members. Inequality is 
supported on the grounds of social utility557 and helping the needy. 
So Rawls' s idea of justice maintains priority for the equality-needs 
concept, including in it a hint of common utility, but really without 
any valuation of merit or desert as such. 
The conclusion will not be to everyone's liking, but at least it is 
quite definite in settling the dilemma of choosing between the two 
traditional concepts. 
Furthermore, if the conclusion really has been reached by a rational 
process of thought instead of appealing to intuitive conviction, we 
ought to accept it. In fact, Rawls's conclusions do not rest purely 
on rational calculations which would seem obvious to anyone. 
556 Stressing the point that charity and justice are in fact two very distinct concepts. 
557 'Social utility' arguments have a strong political impetus, however they might create 
aberrations. Consider Sottomayor-Cardia, a Portugese-speaking philosopher, his ideas 
departs from classical utilitarianism in many ways. In the first place emphasis is laid on the 
concept of "interest" rather than in "happiness". At the same time there is a vindication of a 
certain sort of preference for our own interest when confronted with the maximizing 
principle in its most radical form, as this radical maximizing principle could lead to a sort of 
"pathological Kantianism". Exception is made in cases of "negative" utilitarianism, that is, 
when great greatest common "evil". In such cases the author would even allow for some 
"unjust acts", so that suffering, and every sort of evil for the greatest number could be 
avoided. 
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The general idea of equality in the absence of special 
considerations is rational enough. So is a departure from equality 
for the sake of benefit for all. 
Why should there be special emphasis on benefit for the poor? 
Intuitively, of course, this appeals to our sense of justice, or at any 
rate to our sense of morality. Does Raw ls succeed in showing that 
it would appeal to our sense of self-interest if we were clothed in a 
veil of ignorance concerning our personal situation? 
Rawls assumes that a rational self-interested man will always play 
safe, will think most of cushioning his position if he should turn out 
to be unlucky. Suppose this hypothetical contractor contemplates 
two alternative forms of society. One follows the policy of a 
radical Welfare State, always providing quite a soft cushion for the 
people at the bottom of the social scale but inevitably at the 
expense of high taxation for the rest, so that nobody is excessively 
well off. 
The second society still has a cushion for its poorer members, but a 
less comfortable cushion, and therefore it can leave scope for a few 
people to gain glittering prizes as the result of special talent, special 
effort, or simple luck. If we are asked which of the two is the more 
just society, we may well say the first, but that is an intuitive 
judgement. Ifwe are asked which of the two would be chosen by a 
purely self-interested individual who did not know what his 
personal abilities and fortunes would tum out to be, is it clear that 
he would go for the first alternative? Why should he necessarily 
play safe and think mainly of what will happen to him if he is 
unlucky? Why should he not take a bit of a gamble? In the second 
society, he will not be so badly off even if he lands up at the 
bottom of the pile, and there is always the chance that he might 
tum out to be one of the fortunate few. 
-407
Just Problems? Id-Dritt 2006 - Volume XIX 
The idea of self-interest itself does not imply any preference 
between timidity and boldness in making this choice. Rawls is not 
justified in assuming that a self-interested man will be timid rather 
than bold. This is obvious from the fact that Rawls' s first principle 
of justice assumes the opposite, namely that a self-interested man 
will prefer boldness to timidity. The first principle requires a 
maximum of equal liberty.
558 This means that the people taking part 
in this hypothetical social contract, and choosing from a self­
interested point of view, will give priority to maximum of liberty 
for all. 
Rawls makes it quite clear that his specification of equal liberty, 
rather than some other kind of equality,559 is deliberate. Is it clear 
that a self-interested person, dissociating himself from the kind of 
society he lives in, would necessarily give the highest priority to 
freedom? Presuming that it makes sense at all to think of self­
interested persons making choices in genuine ignorance of their 
own situation and unaffected by the experience of a particular 
society, why should we say that their choice would be intrepid 
rather than insecure in selecting their first principle of justice, and 
fainthearted rather than resolute in selecting their second principle? 
Rawls' s artifice of a social contract, then, does not give us a 
rational method of deciding between two rival concepts of justice. 
The purpose of the device is to reach impartiality. But that can be 
done in a simpler way. To get away from a self-interested to an 
impartial judgement, all one needs to do is to imagine oneself in the 
shoes of someone else. Is not this in fact the psychological basis of 
the needs concept of justice? If one says that justice requires 
special attention to the needs of the poor, the idea of self-interested 
is quite irrelevant. 
558 First Principle: Liberty - Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second 
Principle: Wealth - Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity. 
559 Such as equality of equal goods, for instance. 
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It is not a question of making sure that there will be help for 
yourself if you ever find yourself landed among the poor. It is a 
question of a sort of self-identification with the poor, an empathic 
bondage between your present "self' and the Poor' s condition. 
One can only appreciate what the poor feel if you imagine what 
you would feel if you were one of them. 
But this is not supposing that you really are one of them, and the 
moral judgement which it produces is an altruistic one, not a self­
interested insurance policy. The question that does need to be 
raised is whether the moral obligation which arises from sympathy 
for the disadvantaged is an obligation of justice. 
Those who have a predilection for the merit-concept of justice will 
not dispute that there is a moral obligation to succour the needy, 
but they will deny that it is an obligation of justice. It is the duty 
of charity, they will say, a finer thing than justice but not to be 
confused with it. 
Justice has to do with entitlements or rights. There is no right to 
charity, as there is a right to what you have earned for yourself. 
Charity is a matter of grace and favour. By all means, a 
conscientious person will feel that he has a duty to be charitable; if 
he thinks of himself merely as doing a favour, he may be tarnishing 
the sheen of charity as a virtue. But for the recipient it is a favour, 
not a right. As a duty, charity is a 'duty of supererogation', 
560 
it 
goes beyond what is absolutely required of us by duties of 'perfect 
obligation', by the demands of justice. 
In referring to Rawls's definition of justice as a sort of ethical 
yardstick hardly propounds a novel concept. 
5
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Aristotle considered in his Nicomachean Ethics what it means to be 
unjust and it is submitted approached that word as a symbol in the 
Jungian sense of the word.
561 
One ends up asking the question 
whether these are just problems or problems of the just? 
Alan Xuereb 
September 2006 
561Thomson, J.A.K., translator of The Ethics of Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 
Markham, Penguin Books Canada Ltd., (1980), p.172. "the word is considered to 
describe both one who breaks the law and one who takes advantage of another, i.e. acts 
unfairly .... just means lawful and fair; and unjust means both unlawful and unfair." 
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